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THE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCER 
RESPONSE UNDER QUOTAS 
Lilyan Fulginiti and Richard Perrin* 
Abstract-Tobin and Houthakker's work on consumer behav- 
ior under quantity rationing has been extended by many 
authors, especially through the use of duality theory. This 
paper uses duality theory to extend the work on demand 
theory under rationing to the case of producer behavior under 
quotas. These results permit estimation of otherwise unob- 
servable market supply and demand structures. The structure 
of the farm economy operating under a tobacco quota system 
is estimated, and the theory is utilized to infer that the supply 
elasticity of tobacco would be about 7.0 if the quotas were 
removed. Estimates such as this are not normally attainable 
without the theory outlined here, even though they are essen- 
tial for the evaluation of policy changes. 
I. Introduction 
T HERE has recently been a revival of interest 
in the implications of rationing, or more gen- 
erally of quantity constraints, in a number of 
different branches of economic theory. Much of 
the earlier work on rationing was done during 
and immediately after World War II. The princi- 
pal results establishing locally valid relationships 
between demand curve slopes under rationed and 
unrationed conditions were derived by Tobin and 
Houthakker (1950-51). Related works were sur- 
veyed by Tobin (1952), the results were later 
restated by Pollak (1969), and were extended by 
Howard (1977), Latham (1980), Neary and 
Roberts (1980), and Deaton (1981). In particular, 
the last two authors illustrate how duality theory 
can be used to generate empirically estimable 
demand functions under rationing in the same 
way that it can do so in the unrationed case. 
In this paper we extend the work on demand 
theory under rationing to explore the implications 
of quantity constraints in the context of produc- 
tion theory. Because of the presence of short-run 
adjustment costs leading to short-run input fixity 
or because of regulatory or institutional con- 
straints, quantity rationing often influences pro- 
duction decisions. Import licensing and quotas 
and the rationing of intermediate inputs are 
widespread in the developing world. In many 
developing countries, agricultural input, output 
and credit markets are often targets of govern- 
ment intervention that results in dual markets. In 
Canada, in the European Community, and in the 
United States, production quotas have been im- 
plemented for dairy products, tobacco, peanuts 
and poultry. Mandatory sales of agricultural out- 
put at below free market prices have been fea- 
tures of India, Indonesia, China, and many 
African nations. Quantity restrictions became 
widely used in international trade as substitute 
tariffs after the Tokyo round of GATT negotia- 
tions. All of these cases have a common attribute, 
kink points in the iso-cost sets of firms. These 
kink points arise from binding constraints on 
inputs or outputs or other types of restrictions 
that result in kink points in the interior (as op- 
posed to the vertices) of iso-cost sets, the extreme 
case being a quantity constraint. 
In empirical analysis, it is often important to be 
able to represent an unrationed supply/demand 
function in terms of a rationed one, and vice- 
versa. Such functions are necessary if we wish to 
predict behavior under rationing where we have 
observations only on free supply; more impor- 
tantly, they can be used in the converse situation 
of predicting unrationed behavior from observa- 
tions on a market under rationing. Similarly, we 
may wish to estimate a system of firm supplies 
and derived demands for a cross-section or time- 
series of firms, some of which are rationed and 
some of which are not. Such functions can be 
estimated efficiently if a common technology with 
common parameters is assumed for all firms so 
that the same parameters appear in the two sets 
of functions. In this paper, section II character- 
izes the firm's behavior under rationing in terms 
of its unconstrained behavior when faced with 
virtual prices. Section III discusses the specifica- 
tion of flexible functional form models under 
rationing. Finally, an empirical example is pre- 
sented in which the structure of the unrestricted 
supply curve of a quota-restricted commodity, 
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98 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
tobacco, is retrieved from observations on the 
quota-restricted markets. This methodology pro- 
vides the necessary information to simulate the 
effects of deregulation. Section V is a summary 
with conclusions. 
II. Quota-Constrained Versus 
Unconstrained Behavior 
In their classic treatment, Tobin and 
Houthakker manipulated the first-order condi- 
tions to obtain properties of the derivatives of the 
rationed demands. They obtained locally valid 
relationships between the derivatives of the ra- 
tioned and unrationed functions; for example, the 
Le Chatelier result (Samuelson, 1947, pp. 163-69) 
that at the price at which the ration would have 
been just bought, the compensated demand curve 
is no steeper with rationing than without it. Pa- 
pers by Wales and Woodland (1983), Hausman 
(1985), and Lee and Pitt (1986) have proposed 
methods for estimating consumer demand sys- 
tems in the presence of binding constraints. Wales 
and Woodland's approach is based upon the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with a direct 
utility function, while Lee and Pitt's is a dual 
approach beginning with an indirect utility func- 
tion and showing how "virtual price"1 relation- 
ships can take the place of Kuhn-Tucker con- 
ditions. We extend the analysis to that of 
production technologies where kink points may 
occur because of binding non-negativity con- 
straints on inputs or outputs or because of pro- 
duction quotas and rationing of inputs. 
Consider a firm with netput vector y= 
(Y1, Y2)', where Y1 is a vector of unconstrained 
netputs (with positive signs for outputs and nega- 
tive for inputs) and Y2 is a vector of netputs that 
are traded in the market but are subject to quo- 
tas. In the short run (when a vector z of inputs is 
fixed), the variable profit function when Y2 is 
unconstrained by quotas is 
F1U(P1, P2; Z) 
= max (Py1 + P'2y2: (Y1, Y2, Z) E r), 
YI, Y2 
(1) 
where T is the technology set, 'and p1 and P2 are 
netput prices. The properties we assume for this 
function are standard: nondecreasing in output 
prices and fixed inputs, nonincreasing in input 
prices, linear homogeneous and convex in prices, 
concave in fixed quantities, continuous and twice 
differentiable. When Y2 are constraining quota 
levels, the firm's constrained variable profit func- 
tion is 
FJC(P1, P2; Y2, Z) 
= max(plyl +P'2y2:(Y1,Y2,Z) &i-) 
Yi 
= max(p'yYl; (Y1, Y2, Z) E T) + P2Y2 
Y1 
= HIP(P1; Y2, Z) +P2Y2, (2) 
where the function HIP is a restricted profit func- 
tion that we refer to as the "partial profit" func- 
tion, independent of P2. The partial profit 
function (2) shares the properties of the uncon- 
strained variable profit function as described 
above. 
To establish the relationship between the un- 
constrained profit function (1) and the quota-con- 
strained profit function (2), we turn again to the 
concept of "virtual" price. We define virtual 
prices as the vector of prices p, that would in- 
duce the firm to freely choose the netput vector 
Y 2. Hence, PU must be a function of p1, y2 and z, 
or 
PU = PU(Pl; Y2, Z) (3) 
We can now evaluate the unconstrained profit 
function (4) at P2 = pu as 
rl'(Pi, Pu; z) 
= max (PY1l + Pf.Y2: ( y1, Y2,z) E ) 
YI, Y2 
= HII(P1;Y2,Z) +PfY2, (4) 
and from Hotelling's lemma, we may formally 
define pv as the solution to 
FPU = (5) 
Now, at virtual prices for quota commodities, 
constrained and unconstrained profit must be 
equal, 
HIC(P1, Pv; Y2, Z) = FIU( Pl, Pv; Z), (6) 
and from (2) and (4) we establish the relationship 
between constrained and unconstrained profit 
1 
"Virtual" prices (Rothbarth (1941)) are the prices that 
would induce an unrationed household to behave in the same 
manner as when faced with a given vector of ration con- 
straints. 
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functions as 
HIC(P1, P2; Y2, z) = HIU(pi, Pv; z) 
+ (P2 -Pv)Y2- (7) 
We can characterize the differences between 
the quota-constrained and unconstrained firm be- 
havior by examining first and second derivatives 
of (7). Differentiating with respect to p1 and 
using (5) we obtain 
=P FP + (Hl Y2) d HP1. (8) 
Applying Hotelling's lemma to (8), we conclude 
that 
YC1(P1,P2; Y2, Z) = Y1U(P1P,P; Z), (9) 
that is, the optimal vector of non-quota goods 
under a quota regime (yc) is identical to the 
optimal unconstrained vector (yu) if the latter is 
evaluated at virtual prices. 
Differentiating (7) with respect to quota levels 
Y2, we obtain 
(l Y2 P-JV) + (1lp- )d dY2) 
= (P2 -P) (10) 
Thus, the marginal effect of a change in the quota 
level is simply the difference between the market 
price and the virtual price for the quota input or 
output (see figure 1). We refer to this value as 
quota rent, designated as r = P2 - P,V 
Finally, differentiating (7) with respect to fixed 
inputs z, 
nZ = rlz + rlpl -Y2) d =H  (11) 
az 
Thus, the vector of shadow prices for the fixed 
FIGURE 1.-VIRTUAL PRICE (p,1) AND QUOTA LEVELS 
FOR OUTPUT Y2, 
P2j Pvj 
p2j 
P2 a 
yo y2j yu y2 
2j 2] 2j 
inputs is the same under a quota regime as under 
a non-quota regime evaluated at P2 = P,. 
The comparative statics of the non-quota and 
quota regimes can be further elaborated by deriv- 
ing the Hessians of the former in terms of the 
latter and vice-versa. To do this, we first differ- 
entiate (8) with respect to p1 and Y2 to obtain 
P = HlPP + (H11 )' dp" (12) 
and 
IP1Y2 (11P ) d (13) 
Now differentiating (10) with respect to p1 and 
Y2, we have 
dpv 
Y2P (14) 
and 
Y2Y2 dy (15) 
Finally, we differentiate (5) with respect to y2, to 
obtain 
dpv 
rlP P d L=I. (16) 
Equations (12)-(16) may be solved for the Hes- 
sians of the unconstrained equilibrium in terms of 
those of the constrained equilibrium as follows. 
First combine (15) and (16) to obtain 
PV=- (H1Y2Y2) - (17) 
Next, from (13) and (15) 
pip" = - FPlY2 (Fl Y2Y2) *( 18) 
Finally, from (12), (14), and (18), 
pipu = ip -Il 
y IlY22 )2Y2 Y2P1 C 
In a similar fashion the Hessian of the con- 
strained profit function may be expressed in terms 
of the unconstrained Hessians as 
I1Y2 - (Flu) , (20) 
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and 
1 =C Hl U - lU (H l p ( ) U (22) 
Given equation (2), the results in equations (17) 
to (22) are preserved if we replace FlC by FIP 
everywhere. 
Equations (17)-(19) show how one may deduce 
the slopes of the supply and demand curves of a 
non-quota regime if slopes for a quota regime are 
known, while equations (20)-(22) provide the op- 
posite transformation. Since these results are de- 
rived from FlU evaluated at P2 = PV, the transfor- 
mations are exact only at the quota-constrained 
equilibrium corresponding to quota level Y2. The 
results provide second-order approximations to 
the unconstrained profit function in the vicinity of 
the constrained equilibrium. This is equivalent to 
a first-order approximation of the supply and 
demand functions such as that shown in figure 1. 
Here we can see that the estimates of a profit 
function for a firm constrained by a quota to 
output ylj will provide estimates of the uncon- 
strained equilibrium level y2u via linear approxi- 
mation through point a. 
Some additional interpretation of these results 
is useful. The last term of (19) is negative semi- 
definite, and the last in (22) is positive semi-defi- 
nite (Lau, 1976). Thus, under quota constraints, 
the quantity responses to price changes are 
smaller than those in the unrationed case, i.e., 
the LeChatelier effect. For the case of a single 
rationed output commodity such as we consider 
later in this paper, equation (19) shows that the 
own-price supply elasticity of a variable output 
under a non-quota regime is equal to its own-price 
elasticity under a quota regime plus a non-nega- 
tive term. The non-negative term is the product 
of three sub-terms: the response of variable out- 
puts to the quota level; the response of the quota 
commodity to its virtual price; and the response 
of virtual prices to the price of variable commodi- 
ties. The second term is non-positive due to con- 
cavity of the profit function, and the first and 
third have the same sign. 
From (21), if there is but one rationed com- 
modity, the effect of a quota on output (input)y2j, 
i.e., a decrease in y2j, on a non-quota output is to 
increase the supply (demand) of the latter if they 
are gross substitutes and to decrease it if they are 
gross complements. Since the order of differen- 
tiation is irrelevant, (21) also indicates that the 
effect on non-quota outputs of relaxing the con- 
straint is equal to the effect of a decrease in the 
price of the non-quota output on the "virtual" 
price of the quota commodity. Therefore, an in- 
crease in the price of the non-quota commodity 
causes the virtual price of quota commodities to 
rise if they are gross substitutes and to fall if they 
are gross complements. 
Two extensions of the results (17)-(22) are in 
order at this point. The first has to do with the 
relationship between the Hessian of the partial 
profit function and that of the unrestricted profit 
function. Note that from (2), HI1Pj = Il , 
Il Ply2= H=1y2, and Fl P - FHC2y2, thus the 
transformations between the Hessians of the par- 
tial profit and unconstrained profit are the same 
as those between constrained profit and uncon- 
strained profit as shown in (17)-(22). 
The second extension is to show transforma- 
tions between the elasticities associated with the 
unconstrained, constrained and partial profit 
functions. The notation for elasticities is as fol- 
lows. Let y represent the vector of netputs as 
before, or any subset of y that is of interest, and 
let p represent the corresponding vector of prices. 
Let q represent any arbitrary subvector of argu- 
ments with respect to which elasticities are to be 
calculated. Elasticities of optimal netput values, 
y, with respect to q can be expressed as 
Eyq = D-1HpqDq, (23) 
where Eyq is the matrix of elasticities of netputs 
y with respect to q, and Dy Dq are diagonal 
matrices with the diagonal consisting of y and q, 
respectively. 
From (10) and (23) it is evident that the elastic- 
ity of quota rent with respect to quota levels can 
be expressed as 
EC D-1FI Cy DY2. (24) 
ry2 = r Y2Y2 2 
Also, 
EU =D lH p Dup. (25) Y2Pc Y2 PPL 
Solving these for the derivatives of the profit 
function, substituting into (17) and simplifying, 
we obtain 
U = -(Ery )1Dr7lDp - 1(EPuY2 
(17a) 
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PRODUCER RESPONSE UNDER QUOTAS 101 
Similarly, we obtain 
Eyup= -Eyc y 2(E cy 2 ) r- 'DP, 
= -EYPlY2(EpPvY2) (18a) 
and 
Eu1~ = Ec1 - E EC_E Eyipi Eyipi EyIY2ry2) Erp I 
= EYP1 - EYP Y(EPP,Y2 EP/. (19a) 
The constrained profit function (2) represents 
variable producer profits under rationing and it is 
particularly useful in welfare analysis of ra- 
tioning. It provides a basis for an empirical mea- 
surement of the willingness of the decision-maker 
to pay for a particular change in some parameter, 
say, from ao to a1. The cost or willingness to pay 
for such a change can be measured as 
W= Fl'c da. (26) 
a0 0 
If a = Pli, then using Hotelling's lemma, the 
amount by which the firm must be compensated 
for a price change is given by 
i= tfFlcdpli. (27) 
This provides a measure of the change in pro- 
ducer surplus due to a price change. The pres- 
ence of rationing poses no new difficulties for the 
calculation of valid measures of producer surplus. 
Using the restricted profit function in (2), and 
with a = y 0, some useful additional welfare re- 
sults can be obtained. Using (10), we have 
I ~ ~~~~1 ly2l j FI y i OP2 i Pvi di 
=P2j(Y2j- Y2j) - JPvj(P1; Y2, Z) dy2j1 
(28) 
The above expression provides an exact measure 
of the firm's willingness to pay for a change in the 
quota level of output i. The shaded area of figure 
1 illustrates this change in variable profits due to 
additional units of Y2j produced. 
From (28), the compensation required for a 
change in quantity constraints can be measured 
from price and quantity data and knowledge of 
the virtual price functions pvj defined above. 
Such information is particularly useful in the eco- 
nomic evaluation of changes in quota policies. 
III. A Translog Specification 
The foregoing theory suggests that an uncon- 
strained supply and demand system can be de- 
rived from a partial profit function estimated 
under a quota regime (or vice versa). We specify 
a translog structure for the partial profit function, 
ln FlP = ao + a'X + 'X'BX, (29) 
where X' = (ln p1, ln Y2, ln z)' and ao, a' and B 
are parameters to be estimated (a scalar, a vector 
and a matrix, respectively). A convenient parti- 
tioning consists of a' = (ap, ay , az)', and 
Bpp Bpy Bpz 
B= Byp Byy Byz. 
Bzp Bzy Bzz 
Using Hotelling's lemma, the share equations 
for the n non-quota-constrained variable inputs 
and outputs are 
s, = ap + Bpp ln p1 + Bpy ln Y2 + Bpz ln z, 
(30) 
where si is an n x 1 vector of optimal shares 
si= piyli/lP. Note that Byy and BYZ which 
are needed to evaluate (17)-(22), cannot be esti- 
mated from this set of share equations. The par- 
tial profit function itself must be estimated, either 
alone or jointly with the share equations. 
Given the assumptions as stated earlier, the 
profit function must satisfy the properties of sym- 
metry, monotonicity, linear homogeneity and con- 
vexity in prices, and concavity in fixed quantities. 
Appropriate restrictions on the parameters are 
imposed in the estimation procedure so that the 
translog profit function satisfies symmetry and 
linear homogeneity in prices. Monotonicity, con- 
vexity and concavity are not general properties of 
the translog. They cannot be conveniently im- 
posed with linear restrictions on parameters of 
equations (29) and (30). Instead, the consistency 
of the estimated share equations with these prop- 
erties must be evaluated after estimation. To 
satisfy the monotonicity condition, the estimated 
shares must be positive. For convexity in prices, 
the Hessian implied by the estimated Bpp subma- 
trix must be positive semidefinite, and for concav- 
ity in fixed quantities, the Hessians implied by 
Byy and Bzz must be negative semidefinite. 
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102 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
Once the parameters of (29) are estimated, the 
"virtual" shares (defined as Pvjy2jl/HP) for the 
quota commodities may be estimated as 
-sv =ay + Byp ln p1 +BylnY2 Byz ln z. 
(31) 
The full response elasticity matrix consists of 
responses of netputs, virtual prices, and shadow 
prices (for fixed inputs) with respect to netput 
prices, quota levels, and fixed input levels. This 
elasticity matrix can be evaluated for a given set 
of values of the exogenous variables by using the 
estimated coefficients and the predicted shares as 
EP = (B - Ds + ss')Ds1, (32) 
where EP is the matrix of elasticities of netputs, 
virtual prices and shadow prices of inputs with 
respect to prices, quota levels and fixed inputs, 
and s is a vector of predicted shares for the given 
values of exogeneous variables. 
IV. An Application: Estimating Tobacco 
Supply Elasticity 
The production of U.S. tobacco has been sub- 
ject to federal output restrictions since the 1930s, 
first in the form of acreage controls, and later in 
the form of production quotas (since 1965 for 
flue-cured tobacco, and since 1971 for burley, the 
other major tobacco type).2 In this section we 
utilize the theory developed to estimate the sup- 
ply elasticity of this crop, a crucial parameter in 
evaluating potential changes in tobacco policy. 
A. The Data 
We have chosen to estimate the tobacco supply 
elasticity for North Carolina, which is the largest 
tobacco-producing state, accounting for about 
one-third of total U.S. production. The primary 
reason for estimation at the state level is that 
tobacco constitutes a, substantial share of agricul- 
tural production value in that state (between 20% 
and 50% over the 1950-1984 data period), thus 
providing a richer empirical base than would be 
the case for U.S. agriculture as a whole, in which 
tobacco's share of revenues is less than 4% dur- 
ing this period. We estimate a structure with two 
outputs (tobacco and all other crop and livestock 
products), one variable input (production inputs 
including hired labor) and three fixed inputs (land, 
capital and the stock of research knowledge). 
Table 1 describes these variables. 
Among the data required for estimation of the 
profit function are expected prices, which are not 
directly observable. Our proxy for expected prices 
is a set of predictions from ARIMA (p, d, q) 
models estimated from the time series of realized 
prices. Using Akaike's (1974) information crite- 
rion and the Q-statistic (Ljung and Box, 1978), 
the accepted models were an AR (1) for output 
price and an AR (2) for variable input price. 
B. Econometric Estimation 
We estimate equations (29) and (30), with slight 
modifications for estimation purposes. First, ran- 
dom disturbance terms (Ei) were added to the 
profit and share equations. These disturbances 
represent the effects of random weather condi- 
tions and approximation error; they are assumed 
to be homoscedastic and uncorrelated within 
equations. Contemporaneous cross-equation cor- 
relation of the disturbance terms is permitted. 
If, besides satisfying the above assumptions, 
the vector of disturbances is multinormally dis- 
tributed, maximum likelihood estimation can be 
performed. Under the stated stochastic assump- 
tions, the maximum likelihood estimators are 
consistent, asymptotically normal, and asymptoti- 
cally efficient. In addition, they provide estimates 
invariant to the choice of equation deleted. The 
ITSUR option of the SYSNLIN procedure in 
SAS was used for estimation. 
Using the expected prices fitted with the AR 
models and the data described in the previous 
section, equations (29) and (30) are estimated by 
the method of maximum likelihood. Cross-equa- 
tion symmetry and identity restrictions are im- 
posed along with linear homogeneity in prices. 
Aggregation consistency requires homogeneity of 
degree one in fixed commodities, so these restric- 
tions are also imposed. The system has two equa- 
tions, the dependent variables being the loga- 
2 Quotas are allocated to firms that could sell or rent them 
to firms within their county but in most years not to firms 
across county lines. This implies different marginal costs across 
counties. The rationing problem should then be modeled 
allowing for as many rations as counties. In this paper we 
abstract from this to simplify the model. In a recent study, 
Rucker, Thurman, and Sumner (1990) conclude that the wel- 
fare effects associated with removal of the cross county re- 
strictions is small. This suggests that the mis-specification 
implied by our simplification may not be serious. 
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PRODUCER RESPONSE UNDER QUOTAS 103 
TABLE 1.-VARIABLES DESCRIBING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
H1P partial profit: the value of crops and livestock produced, not including tobacco, minus 
the value of variable inputs described below. 
y11 variable output: the value of production of all crop and livestock products other 
than tobacco, deflated to 1950 dollars using the GDP deflator. Realized price is a 
Tornquist-Theil index of deflated prices received by North Carolina farmers. Expected 
price is from an ARIMA estimator described in the text. 
Y12 variable input: total farm production expenses, less depreciation, property taxes and net 
rent to non-operator landlords, deflated to 1950 dollars using the GDP deflator. 
Realized price is a Tornquist-Theil index of U.S.-wide price indexes weighted by North 
Carolina expenditure shares, deflated by the GNP deflator. Expected price is from an 
ARIMA estimator described in the text. 
Y2 tobacco: millions of pounds produced 
z1 land: millions of acres of harvested cropland 
Z2 capital: the value of machinery and motor vehicles on N.C. farms deflated to 1950 
dollars. For the period 1950-1970, this value was available only for the United States as 
a whole. For this period, the North Carolina share of this U.S. value was estimated to 
be the same as the share of N.C. tractors on farms to U.S. tractors on farms, as 
available from the agricultural censuses and interpolated linearly between census years. 
Z3 stock of research knowledge: a distributed lag of deflated state and federal funds 
expended by the N.C. Agricultural Research Service. The lag distribution consisted of a 
13-year inverted-V. 
rithm of profits and the variable output share. 
The stacked model has 64 observations and 16 
estimated parameters. 
Collinearity diagnostics developed by Belsley, 
Kuh and Welsch (1980) indicate an absence of 
strong multicollinearity. Because time-series data 
are used, the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals is possible. Simple Durbin-Watson 
statistics for each of the equations in the system 
fall in the inconclusive range. A test for the joint 
hypothesis that the autocorrelation parameter in 
each equation is equal to zero, proposed by Judge 
et al. (1980), does not reject the null hypothesis 
(for this problem q - X22 is calculated to be 4.09 
and the 0.05 critical value is 5.99). Both of these 
procedures test for the existence of serial correla- 
tion occurring within a single equation but do not 
consider the more general case in which errors 
may also be serially correlated between equa- 
tions. Guilkey's (1974) Wald test statistic for a 
system of simultaneous equations that do not 
contain lagged endogenous variables as regres- 
sors is calculated as 6.51. For four degrees of 
freedom, the Chi-square critical value at the 5% 
level is 9.48. Therefore, this statistic does not 
lead to rejection of the hypothesis that the matrix 
of first-order vector autoregressive coefficients is 
zero. Estimation proceeded under the assump- 
tion of serially independent errors. R2 obtained 
from OLS residuals are 0.78 for the profit equa- 
tion and 0.71 for the output share equation. Table 
2 presents the parameter estimates of the re- 
stricted model. The table contains a total of 
twenty-eight parameters, six of which are signifi- 
cant at the 1% level, five at the 5% level, and six 
at the 10% level. 
In addition to the imposed properties of sym- 
metry and homogeneity, monotonicity and con- 
vexity in prices are additional properties of a 
profit function that cannot be satisfied globally 
with the translog function. However, they may 
hold at the specific data points used in estimating 
the function. For the estimates in table 2, mono- 
tonicity is satisfied at the point of expansion, but 
is violated for 2 out of 6 predicted shares at the 
mean,of the data, and for 39 of the 192 predicted 
shares at the individual data points. Convexity is 
violated if own-price elasticities have the wrong 
sign. There are no such violations at the average 
of the data points, but there are at 44 of the 192 
data points. 
C. Estimates of Supply and Demand Elasticities 
We use equation (32), with predicted shares 
evaluated at the mean values of variables, to 
calculate the estimated elasticities of optimal pro- 
duction decisions in response to changes in prices 
and fixed quantities. The results, shown in table 
3, indicate a non-tobacco output supply elasticity 
of 0.24 and a derived variable input demand 
elasticity of - 0.41, estimates that are lower than 
we expected but consistent with other estimates 
of aggregate agricultural supply and demand elas- 
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TABLE 2.-MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE TRANSLOG PROFIT 
FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
Explanatory Variables 
Second Order Coefficients 
Dependent First Order Price of Quantity of 
Variable Coefficient Output Inputs Tobacco Land Capital Research 
Output 4.75411 - 2.53356 2.53356 - 0.13513 - 0.71337 0.84852 -0.98913 
(1.95623) (0.29508) (0.29508) (0.40117) (0.34628) (0.38929) (0.19681) 
Inputs - 3.75411 - 2.5336 0.13515 0.71337 - 0.84852 2.95917 
(1.95623) (0.29508) (0.40117) (0.34628) (0.38929) (0.68700) 
Tobacco -11.93763 - 2.00720 6.81942 - 4.81220 2.68471 
(16.51615) (3.96009) (3.04188) (2.96793) (1.45328) 
Land 3.92327 
-11.86200 5.04214 -4.47800 
(12.49898) (3.64586) (2.76176) (1.67087) 
Capital 9.01436 
- 0.22991 1.79325 
(18.09359) (3.88699) (1.98842) 
Research 1.26446 
- 0.92058 
(8.97853) (1.20012) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
TABLE 3.-ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES, EVALUATED AT THE MEAN OF THE VARIABLES 
Elasticities with respect to 
Output Input Tobacco Land Capital 
Variable Price Price Quota Quantity Quantity Research 
Output 0.24 -0.24 - 1.01 1.97 0.04 1.76 
Input 0.41 -0.41 -1.06 1.74 0.32 -0.05 
Supply Price Tobacco 2.47 -1.47 0.14 -4.86 4.71 -0.63 
Shadow Price Land 2.01 - 1.01 2.04 - 3.94 1.90 0.21 
Shadow Price Capital -0.32 1.32 14.07 - 13.47 - 0.60 - 3.42 
Shadow Price Research 1.87 0.03 0.27 0.22 0.50 0.76 
ticities. The key elasticity of interest in this study 
is the price elasticity of the latent tobacco supply 
curve, which is the inverse of the third element 
on the diagonal of table 3. This estimated price 
elasticity is about 7.0. This is a large elasticity, 
larger than the recent estimates of 4.0 to 5.6 by 
Goodwin and Sumner (1990), who used a differ- 
ent approach with cross-sectional county-level 
data for a recent ten-year period. These large 
elasticity estimates are quite plausible in view of 
the fact that tobacco utilizes only 7% of har- 
vested cropland and perhaps higher proportions 
of other inputs, virtually all of which can be 
reallocated between tobacco and other products. 
The remaining diagonal elements in table 3 
indicate that the derived demand elasticities for 
land and capital are -0.25 and - 1.66, respec- 
tively (with other prices constant and tobacco 
quota fixed), and that there are increasing 
marginal returns to the research variable. Other 
key results from table 3 related to the existence 
of a quota commodity are the negative unit elas- 
ticities of output and variable input use with 
respect to changes in the tobacco quota (the first 
is plausible, the second is surprising but plausi- 
ble). The elasticity of tobacco supply price with 
respect to the price of other output is 2.47 and 
with respect to the price of variable inputs is 
- 1.47 (an unexpected and implausible sign). This 
partial review of the econometric results indicates 
that the diagonal elements of the elasticities in 
table 3 have appropriate signs and expected mag- 
nitudes, while the off-diagonal elements contain 
some estimates that are difficult to rationalize, 
though theoretically possible. 
Since this approach to estimating the latent 
tobacco supply elasticity rests on measuring the 
economic effects of reallocating resources be- 
tween tobacco and other jointly produced out- 
puts, it is useful to test this jointness property. 
For the restricted profit function, nonjointness 
between aggregate output and tobacco requires 
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that the second-order cross coefficient between 
these two variables (- 0.135 in our case) be equal 
to the negative of the product of the correspond- 
ing first-order coefficients (4.75 and -11.94 in 
our case). A likelihood ratio test, conditional on 
the maintained hypothesis of symmetry, homo- 
geneity in prices and in fixed commodities, rejects 
this null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
Equation (19a) provides a measure of how the 
supply elasticity of non-tobacco products would 
change if the tobacco quota system were elimi- 
nated. We obtain the surprising result that elimi- 
nation of quotas would increase the non-tobacco 
supply elasticity from 0.24 to 17.81. To see why 
this effect is so large, recall that the last matrix 
expression of (19a) augments the elasticity matrix 
for a quota regime to obtain the corresponding 
portion of the elasticity matrix for an uncon- 
strained regime. For the case of a single rationed 
commodity and a single aggregate of other com- 
modities, the augmentation of output supply elas- 
ticity consists of the negative of the following 
product: elasticity of tobacco virtual price with 
respect to other output price (2.47) times the 
elasticity of tobacco output with respect to to- 
bacco virtual price (7.14) times the elasticity of 
other output with respect to tobacco output 
(-1.01), which equals 17.81. The comparable 
LeChatelier effect on input demand is to increase 
elasticity from -0.41 to - 1.97, also a very large 
effect. These large elasticities and LeChatelier 
effects could be valid at the average of our data 
set but seem unlikely to hold over the range 
between the constrained and unconstrained equi- 
librium points, so we are more cautious in making 
inferences from those results than from the esti- 
mated supply elasticity of tobacco itself. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
We have discussed the theory of producer re- 
sponse under quotas and have shown how duality 
theory and the concept of virtual prices may be 
used to simplify and extend this theory. Among 
the implications of our results are the fact that 
behavior under rationing may be predicted from 
a knowledge of behavior in an unrationed regime 
and vice versa. This information is important in 
evaluating policies that either impose quotas on a 
previously unconstrained sector or eliminate quo- 
tas in a sector in which they have long obscured 
unconstrained market responses. We examine an 
issue of the latter type, in which we estimate the 
market supply elasticity of tobacco from a time 
series of data during a quota regime that totally 
obscured producer response to tobacco price. The 
estimated supply elasticity is about 7.0, higher 
than estimated by others. This difference has 
implications for measuring the welfare effects of 
changes in the tobacco quota program. We con- 
clude that the approach we develop may be use- 
ful in empirical evaluation of other quota and 
rationing policies where data permit estimation 
of restricted profit functions. 
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